Belgrade: Iraq Through A Balkan
Lens Past U.S. Efforts
Shed Doubt On Post-War Rebuilding Of Iraq
Published: Nov 14 2002
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New York-based Russ Baker is an award-winning
journalist who covers politics and
media. |
Is the Bush administration's promise to
create a democratic paradise in a post-Saddam Iraq for real -- or
just more salesmanship for war? To answer this crucial question, we
would do well to examine recent experiences elsewhere. Afghanistan
could still surprise, but so far, the country's intractable societal
problems seem utterly unmatched by U.S. vision and commitment,
financial or moral. For now, a better predictive model might be the
former Yugoslavia, a fundamentally modern country with a decent
infrastructure and relatively educated populace where Washington has
now had several years to institute reforms. Yet, if this place is
indicative of the U.S. commitment after the bombs stop falling, the
future Iraq won't be a pretty picture.
On almost all fronts, peace and prosperity, transformation and
transparency, democracy and public confidence seem as far away as
ever. So few Serbs turned out for the first post-Milosevic
presidential elections, held in October, that the runoff results had
to be nullified. Neither of the two top candidates talked honestly
about war crimes or discussed ways to secure a lasting regional
peace. Along with apathy and skepticism, nationalist rhetoric
carried the day. The military retains undisputed power and autonomy.
Former cronies of Milosevic suspected of complicity in war crimes
remain in positions of power. The effort to create a free market is
led by a prime minister widely suspected of enriching himself and
his friends. Monopolies and mafia-esque businessmen dominate many
industries.
In Bosnia, instead of guaranteeing peace and security, U.S.
troops were directed to focus on so-called "force protection." The
military brass can point with pride to the fact that this policy
has, to date, resulted in not one attack on U.S. soldiers. But what
else has the mission accomplished? The first U.S. commander of joint
forces on the ground there declared that the troops' only
responsibility would be separating combatants, and claimed
(incorrectly) that he had no mandate to capture war criminals. With
a few notable exceptions, troops in Bosnia repeatedly balked at
taking meaningful actions. They were even sent into retreat by
rock-throwing crowds. Foreign Muslim fundamentalist units operated
in the U.S. sector from at least 1995 until Sept. 11, 2001 but
American troops refused to patrol villages or take action against
them -- least of all to kick them out, as they should have, under
the Dayton Accords.
Despite the creation, on paper, of a multiethnic central
government, today the "country" of Bosnia is effectively governed by
three separate, nationalist governments, one Serb, one Croat, one
Muslim. The bad guys, warlords and sectarians were left largely in
place. Local elections have been shams. And without military
protection, little progress has been made toward returning refugees
to their homes, an essential ingredient if the region is to be
stabilized.
In recent months, a vigorous U.N. high commissioner has been
trying to rectify matters, and, in Kosovo, there appears to be a
concerted effort to learn from mistakes in Bosnia. But in both
places the same political problems remain, structures for
modernization are absent, there are virtually no prospects for
economic reform, and resources are running out. Most importantly, in
light of discussions of emulating in Iraq a post-World War II
Japan-style military occupation, Washington's interest in the
Balkans seems to be fading fast. While U.S. diplomats and
international NGOs on-site are making a creditable effort, without
the full commitment of the White House it's hard to move forward.
Based on the experience here, can anyone believe that U.S. forces
are any more likely to locate and remove the "war criminals" who
helped perpetuate Saddam's reign of terror? Will the United States
do what is necessary to replace regional and local officials who
ally themselves with criminal elements for personal gain, much less
prevent remnants of Saddam's elite military unit leadership and
secret police from establishing fiefdoms and blocking change? Iraq,
a country with a Shiite Muslim majority, is controlled by its Sunni
minority; the long suppressed Kurds want their own homeland. What
will it take to suppress the religious and ethnic rivalries that are
likely to emerge in the vacuum created by Saddam's fall?
The evidence from the Balkans and Afghanistan suggests that
Washington will not carry the ball. Can we depend on the Arab
League? At least in Serbia, a vigorous opposition existed. But
nothing of the sort is to be found in Iraq, and the émigré community
leadership inspires grave doubts among knowledgeable observers. If
the Bush administration is not willing to focus on the hard work to
be done in the former Yugoslavia, who believes for a second it will
make the kind of commitment to transform Iraq into a success story?
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